Since ancient times the coexistence with animals is well known to people, primarily due to survival and existence of human kind, while later this relationship gave rise to much grater benefiects for ourselves. From using animals as clothing and food to providing security and care to people with disabilities as pets, today animals have a more substantial value visible in adequate protection provided by the Animal Protection Act and other existing regulations referring their life, wellbeing, safety, etc. We can not agree that they are generic things holding the same value as all other objects which we can immediately replace when we notice deficiency. Individuals have accepted some animals as family members and developed an affective connection not measurable with objective criteria. Nowadays we consider them extremely skilled and intelligent living being, however, we continue to resist when their systematization is broader than objects of law and the possibility of using copyright laws that people also have. The issue of authorship of animals in the well-known case of American court practice „Naruto v. Slater“ reveals many insufficiently regulated legal issues, not only in American law but also in other legislations, such as guardian ad litem or the right of ownership of animals. It has been learned how animals can create art pieces, but unfortunately, they still cannot be considered copyright holders of these created art pieces. Today, the best regulation of animal authorship issues is presented in the Anglo-American legal expertise with the introduction of the “Trust” institute. After analysing court practice and taking into account the legal interpretation of European legal circles, we come to the promising conclusion that in the future a change is looming when defining the “object” of legal relations or maybe introducing the third term (in addition to persons and things). However, we are still quite at a standstill when we talk about legal legitimation according to the Copyright Act and the question of ownership as shown by judicial theory and practice. Moral rights are also considered in the context of this paper, and further elaboration noted that animals cannot possess moral rights in the author's work in addition to property rights. However, the legislations provide animals with protection of their interests, but only seemingly because they are applied when it suits the interests of humanity. The greatest progress could be achieved if the ownership of animals were abolished because through numerous practice examples in this paper it is emphasized that the abolition of ownership is key to the progress of independence of this specie that has found itself under the human domain.